corresponds to the brute condition of the race, before it had reached self- consciousness, attained language and become man. In the race, however, there was no heredity to predetermine self-consciousness ? it was a new acquisition, marking transition to a superior order of being.
Connecting these remarks with our present subject, we assert that no brute ever yet said, or thought, ?I.? With this, then, we may begin a series of simple distinctions between man and the brute, so far as the immaterial principle in each is concerned. These are mainly compiled from writers hereafter mentioned.
1. The brute is conscious, but man is self-conscious. The brute does not objectify self. ?If the pig could once say, ?I am a pig,? it would at once and thereby cease to be a pig.? The brute does not distinguish itself from its sensations. The brute has perception, but only the man has apperception, i.e., perception accompanied by reference of it to the self to which it belongs.
2. The brute has only percepts; man has also concepts. The brute knows white things, but not whiteness. It remembers things, but not thoughts. Man alone has the power of abstraction, i.e., the power of deriving abstract ideas from particular things or experiences.
3. Hence the brute has no language. ?Language is the expression of general notions by symbols? (Harris). Words are the symbols of concepts. Where there are no concepts there can be no words. The parrot utters cries but ?no parrot ever yet spoke a true word.? Since language is a sign, it presupposes the existence of an intellect capable of understanding the sign. In short, language is the effect of mind, not the cause of mind. See Mivart, in Brit. Quar.. Oct. 1881:154-172. ?The ape?s tongue is eloquent in his own dispraise.? James, Psychology, 2:356 ? ?The notion of a sign as such, and the general purpose to apply it to everything, is the distinctive characteristic of man.? Why do not animals speak? Because they have nothing to say, i.e. , have no general ideas which words might express.
4. The brute forms no judgments, i.e., that, this is like that accompanied with belief. Hence there is no sense of the ridiculous and no laughter. James, Psychology, 2:360
?The brute does not associate ideas by similarity? Genius in man is the possession of this power of association in an extreme degree.?
5. The brute has no reasoning ? no sense that this follows from that, accompanied by a feeling that the sequence is necessary. Association of
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