environment, education and reflection.? The sentiment ofjustice is not an inheritance of civilized man alone. No Indian was ever robbed of his lands or had his government allowance stolen from him who was not as keenly conscious of the wrong as in like circumstances we could conceive that a philosopher would be. The oughtness of the ought is certainly intuitive, the whyness of the ought (conformity to God) is possibly intuitive also and the whatness of the ought is less certainly intuitive. Cutler, Beginnings of Ethics, 163, 164 ? ?Intuition tells us that we are obliged. Why we are obliged and what we are obliged to, we must learn elsewhere.? Obligation = that which is binding on a man, ought is something owed and duty is something due. The intuitive notion of duty (intellect) is matched by the sense of obligation (feeling).
Bixby, Crisis in Morals, 203, 270 ? ?All men have a sense of right ? of right to life and, contemporaneously perhaps but certainly afterwards, of right to personal property. And my right implies duty in my neighbor to respect it. Then the sense of right becomes objective and impersonal. My neighbor?s duty to me implies my duty to him. I put myself in his place.? Bowne, Principles of Ethics, 156, 188 ? ?First, the feeling of obligation, the idea of a right and a wrong with corresponding duties, is universal. Secondly, there is a very general agreement in the formal principles of action and, largely in the virtues also, such as benevolence, justice and gratitude. Whether we owe anything to our neighbor has never been a real question. The practical trouble has always lain in the other question: Who is my neighbor? Thirdly, the specific contents of the moral ideal are not fixed, but the direction in which the ideal lies is generally discernible. We have in ethics the same fact as in intellect ? a potentially infallible standard with manifold errors in its apprehension and application. Lucretius held that degradation and paralysis of the moral nature result from religion. Many claim, on the other hand, that without religion morals would disappear from the earth.?
Robinson, Princ. and Prac. of Morality, 173 ? ?Fear of an omnipotent will is very different from remorse in view of the nature of the supreme Being whose law we have violated.? A duty is to be settled in accordance with the standard of absolute right, not as public sentiment would dictate. A man must be ready to do right in spite of what everybody thinks. Just as the decisions of a judge are for the time binding on all good citizens, so the decisions of Conscience, as relatively binding, must always be obeyed. They are presumptively right and they are the only present guides of action. Yet man?s present state of sin makes it quite possible that the decisions which are relatively right may be absolutely wrong. It is not enough to take one?s time from the watch; the watch may go wrong. There
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