(c) Porter, Human Intellect, 486 ? ?Induction is possible only upon the assumption that the intellect of man is a reflex of the divine intellect, or that man is made in the image of God.? Note, however, that man is made in God?s image, not God in man?s. The painting is the image of the landscape, not, vice versa, the landscape the image of the painting; for there is much in the landscape that has nothing corresponding to it in the painting. Idolatry perversely makes God in the image of man, and so defies man?s weakness and impurity. Trinity in God may have no exact counterpart in man?s present constitution, though it may disclose to us the goal of man?s future development and the meaning of the increasing differentiation of man?s powers. Gore, Incarnation, 116 ? ?If anthropomorphism as applied to God is false, yet theomorphism as applied to man is true; man is made in God?s image, and his qualities are, not the measure of the divine, but their counterpart and real expression.? See Murphy, Scientific Bases, 122; McCosh, in Internat. Rev., 1875:105; Bibliotheca Sacra, 1867:624; Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, 2:4-8, and Study of Religion, 1:94.
C. Because we know only that of which we can conceive, in the sense of forming an adequate mental image. We reply:
(a) It is true that we know only that of which we can conceive, if by the term ?conceive? we mean near distinguishing in thought the object known from all other objects. But,
(b) the objection confounds conception with that which is merely its occasional accompaniment and help, namely, the picturing of the object by the imagination. In this sense, conceivability is not a final test of truth.
(c) That the formation of a mental image is not essential to conception or knowledge, is plain when we remember that, as a matter of fact, we both conceive and know many things of which we cannot form a mental image of any sort that in the least corresponds to the reality; for example, force, cause, law, space, our own minds. So we may know God, though we cannot form an adequate mental image of him.
The objection here refuted is expressed most clearly in the words of Herbert Spencer, First Principles, 23-36, 98 ? ?The reality underlying appearances is totally and forever inconceivable by us.? Mansel, Prolegomena Logica. 77, 78 (cf. 26) suggests the source of this error in a wrong view of the nature of the concept: ?The first distinguishing feature of a concept, viz.: that it cannot in itself be depicted to sense or Imagination.? Porter, human Intellect, 392 (see also 429, 656) ? ?The
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