simply regulative, they will cease to regulate. The forms of thought are also facts of nature. The mind does not, like the glass of a kaleidoscope, itself furnish the forms; it recognizes these as having an existence external to itself. The mind reads its ideas, not into nature, but in nature. Our intuitions are not green goggles, which make all the world seem green; they are the lenses of a microscope, which enable us to see what is objectively real (Royce, Spirit of Mod. Philos, 125). Kant called our understanding ?the legislator of nature.? But it is so, only as discoverer of nature?s laws, not as creator of them. Human reason does impose its laws and forms upon the universe; but, in doing this, it interprets the real meaning of the universe.
[Illegible] Philos . of Knowledge ??All judgment implies an objective truth according to which we judge, which constitutes the standard, and with which we have something in common, i.e., our minds are part of an infinite and eternal Mind.? French aphorism: ?When you are right, you are more right than you think you are.? God will not put us to permanent intellectual confusion. Kant vainly wrote ?No thoroughfare ?over the reason in its highest exercise. Martineau, Study of Religion, 1:135, 136 ? ?Over against Kant?s assumption that the mind cannot know anything outside of itself, we may set Comte?s equally unwarrantable assumption that the mind cannot know itself or its states. We cannot have philosophy without assumptions You dogmatize if you say that the forms correspond with reality; but you equally dogmatize if you say that they do not 79 ?
That our cognitive faculties correspond to things as they are , is much less surprising than that they should correspond to things as they are not .? W.
T. Harris, in Journ. Spec. Philos., 1:22. exposes Herbert Spencer?s self- contradiction: ?All knowledge is, not absolute, but relative; our knowledge of this fact however is, not relative, but absolute.?
Ritschl, Justification and Reconciliation, 3:16-21, sets out with a correct statement of the nature of knowledge, and gives in his adhesion to the doctrine of Lotze, as distinguished from that of Kant. Ritschl?s statement may be summarized as follows:
?We deal, not with the abstract God of metaphysics, but with the God self-limited, who is revealed in Christ. We do not know either things or God apart from their phenomena or manifestations, as Plato imagined; we do not know phenomena or manifestations alone without knowing either things or God, as Kant supposed; but we do know both things and God in their phenomena or manifestations, as Lotze taught. We hold to no mystical union with God, back of all experience in religion, as Pietism does; soul is always and only active, and religion is the activity of the
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