out into a fact as an end or result? (Porter. Hum. Intellect, 592-618); ? health, for example, is the final cause of exercise, while exercise is the efficient cause of health. This definition of the argument would be broad enough to cover the proof of a designing intelligence drawn from the constitution of man. This last, however, is treated as a part of the Anthropological Argument, which follows this, and the Teleological Argument covers only the proof of a designing intelligence drawn from nature. Hence Kant, Critique of Pure Reason (Bohn?s trans.), 381, calls it the physico-theological argument. On methods of stating the argument, see Bibliotheca Sacra, Oct. 1867:625. See also Hedge, Ways of the Spirit, 155-185; Mozley, Essays Hist. and Theol, 2:365-413.
Hicks, in his Critique of Design ? Arguments, 347-389, makes two arguments instead of one: (1) the argument from order to intelligence, to which he gives the name Eutaxiological; (2) the argument from adaptation to purpose, to which he would restrict the name Teleological. He holds that teleology proper cannot prove intelligence, because in speaking of ?ends? at all, it must assume the very intelligence, which it seeks to prove; that it actually does prove simply the intentional exercise of an intelligence whose existence has been previously established. ?Circumstances, forces or agencies converging to a definite rational result imply volition ? imply that this result is intended ? is an end. This is the major premise of this new teleology.? He objects to the term ?final cause.? The end is not a cause at all ? it is a motive. The characteristic element of cause is power to produce an effect. Ends have no such power. The will may choose them or set them aside. As already assuming intelligence, ends cannot prove intelligence.
With this in the main we agree, and count it a valuable help to the statement and understanding of the argument. In the very observation of order, however, as well as in arguing from it, we are obliged to assume the same all arranging intelligence. We see no objection therefore to making Eutaxiology the first part of the Teleological Argument, as we do above. See review of Hicks, in Methodist Quarterly Rev., July, 1883:569576. We proceed however to certain
1. Further explanations.
A. The major premise expresses a primitive conviction. It is not invalidated by the objections:
<- Previous Table of Contents Next ->
Was this article helpful?