the truth. Bowne, Introduction to Psych. Theory, 257, 258 ? ?In Sir William Hamilton?s desire to have no go-betweens in perception, he was forced to maintain that every sensation is felt where it seems to be, and hence that the mind fills out the entire body. Likewise he had to affirm that the object in vision is not the thing, but the rays of light, and even the object itself had, at last, to be brought into consciousness. Thus he reached the absurdity that time true object in perception is something of which we are totally unconscious.? Surely we cannot be immediately conscious of what is outside of consciousness. James, Psychology, 1:11 ? The terminal organs are telephones, and brain cells are the receivers at which the mind listens.? Berkeley?s view is to be found in his Principles of Human Knowledge, 618 sq . See also Presb. Rev., Apl. 1885:301-315; Journ. Spec. Philos., 1884:246-260, 383-399; Tulloch, Mod. Theories, 360, 361; Encyc. Britannica, art.: Berkeley.
There is, however, an idealism, which is not open to Hamilton?s objections, and to which most recent philosophers give their adhesion. It is the objective idealism of Lotze. It argues that we know nothing of the extended world except through the forces, which impress our nervous organism. These forces take the form of vibrations of air or ether, and we interpret them as sound, light, or motion, according as they affect our nerves of hearing, sight, or touch. But the only force which we immediately know is that of our own wills, and we can either not understand matter at all or we must understand it as the product of a will comparable to our own. Things are simply ?concreted laws of action,? or divine ideas to which permanent reality has been given by divine will. What we perceive in the normal exercise of our faculties has existence not only for us but also for all intelligent beings and for God himself: in other words, our idealism is not subjective, but objective. We have seen in the previous section that atoms cannot explain the universe, ? they presuppose both ideas and force. We now see that this force presupposes will, and these ideas presuppose mind. But, as it still may be claimed that this mind is not self conscious mind and that this will is net personal will, we pass in the next section to consider Idealistic Pantheism, of which these claims are characteristic. Materialistic Idealism, in truth, is but a halfway house between Materialism and Pantheism, in which no permanent lodging is to be found by the logical intelligence.
Lotze, Outlines of Metaphysics, 152 ? ?The objectivity of our cognition consists therefore in this, that it is not a meaningless play of mere seeming; but it brings before us a world whose coherency is ordered in pursuance of the injunction of the sole Reality in the world, to wit, the Good. Our cognition thus possesses more of truth than if it copied exactly
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