and when we use these phrases we imply that our central self is felt to be something different from the notions or passions which belong to it or characterize it for a time.? Liehtenberg: ?We should say, ?It thinks; ? just as we say, ?It lightens,? or ?It rains.? In saying ?Cogito,? the philosopher goes too far if he translates it, ?I think.?? Are the faculties, then, an army without a general, or an engine without a driver? In that case we should not have sensations, ? we should only be sensations.

Professor C.A. Strong: ?I have knowledge of other minds. This non- empirical knowledge ? transcendent knowledge of things-in-themselves, derived neither from experience nor reasoning, and assuming that like consequents (intelligent movements) must have like antecedents (thoughts and feelings)? and also assuming instinctively that something?exists outside of my own mind ? this refutes the post-Kantian phenomenalism. Perception and memory also involve transcendence. In both I transcend the bounds of experience, as truly as in my knowledge of other minds. In memory I recognize a past, as distinguished from time present. In perception I cognize a possibility of other experiences like the present, and this alone gives the sense of permanence and reality. Perception and memory refute phenomenalism. Things-in-themselves must be assumed in order to fill the gaps between individual minds, and to give coherence and intelligibility to the universe, and so to avoid pluralism. If matter can influence and even extinguish our minds, it must have some force of its own, some existence in itself. If consciousness is an evolutionary product, it must have arisen from simpler mental facts. But these simpler mental facts are only another name for things-in-themselves. A deep pre-rational instinct compels us to recognize them, for they cannot be logically demonstrated. We must assume them in order to give continuity and intelligibility to our conceptions of the universe.? See, on Bain?s Cerebral Psychology, Martineau?s Essays, 1:265. On the physiological method of mental philosophy, see Talbot, in Bap. Quar., 1871:1; Bowen, in Princeton Rev., March, 1878:423-450; Murray, Psychology, 279-287.

3. In so far as this theory regards mind as the obverse side of matter, or as a later and higher development from matter, the mere reference of both mind and matter to an underlying force does not save the theory from any of the difficulties of pure materialism already mentioned; since in this case, equally with that, force is regarded as purely physical, and the priority of spirit is denied.

Herbert Spencer, Psychology, quoted by Fiske, Cosmic Philosophy, 2:80 ? ?Mind and nervous action are the subjective and objective faces of the same thing. Yet we remain utterly incapable of seeing, or even of

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