and by the necessity, in that case of presupposing a fuller knowledge of sin and redemption than was common to the ancient world.
(b) The mere correct derivation is from relegere, ?to go over again,? ?carefully to ponder.? Its original meaning is therefore ?reverent observance? (of duties due to the gods).
For advocacy of the derivation of religio, as meaning ?binding duty,? from religare, see Lange, Dogmatik, 1:185-196. This derivation was first proposed by Lactantius, Inst. Div., 4:28, a Christian writer. To meet the objection that the form religio seems derived from a verb of the third conjugation, Lange cites rebellio , from rebellare , and optio, from optare
. But we reply that these verbs of the first conjugation, like many others, are probably derived from obsolete verbs of the third conjugation. For the derivation favored in the text, see Curtius, Griechische Etymologie, 5te Aufl., 364; Fick, Vergl. Worterb.,. der indoger. Spr.. 2:227; Vanicek, Gr. ? I.at. Etym.. Worterb.,.,2:829; Andrews, Latin Lexicon, in voce ; Nitzsch, System of Christ. Doctrine,7; Van Oosterzee, Dogmatics, 7577; Philippi, Glaubenslehre, 1:6; Kahnis, Dogmatik, 3:18; Menzies, History of Religion, 11; Max Muller, Natural Religion, lect. 2.
(a) Religion is not, as Hegel declared, a kind of knowing; for it would then be only an incomplete form of philosophy, and the measure of knowledge in each case would be the measure of piety.
In a system of idealistic pantheism, like that of Hegel, God is the subject of religion as well as its object. Religion is God?s knowing of himself through the human consciousness.. Hegel did not utterly ignore other elements in religion. ?Feeling, intuition, and faith belong to it,? he said, ?and mere cognition is one ? sided.? Yet he was always looking for the movement of thought in all forms of life; God and the universe were best developments of the primordial idea . ?What knowledge is worth knowing,? he asked, ?if God is unknowable? To know God is eternal life, and thinking is also true worship.? Hegel?s error was in regarding life as a process of thought, rather than in regarding thought as a process of life. Here was the reason for the bitterness between Hegel and Schleiermacher. Hegel rightly considered that feeling must become intelligent before it is truly religious, but he did not recognize the supreme importance of love in a theological system. He gave even less place to the will than he gave to the emotions, and he failed to see that the knowledge of God of which
Was this article helpful?