? phenomenal.? McCosh, Intuitions, 138-154, states the characteristics of substance as (1) being, (2) power, and (3) permanence. Diman, Theistic Argument, 337, 363 ? ?The theory that disproves God, disproves an external world and the existence of the soul.? We know something beyond phenomena, viz.: law, cause, force ? or we can have no science; see Tulloch, on Comte, in Modern Theories, 53-73; see also Bibliotheca Sacra, 1874:211; Alden, Philosophy, 44; Hopkins, Outline Study of Man, 87: Fleming, Vocab. of Philosophy, art.: Phenomena; New Englander. July, 1875:537-539

B. Because we can know only that which bears analogy to our own nature or experience. We reply:

(a) It is not essential to knowledge that there be similarity of nature between the knower and the known. We know by difference as well as by likeness.

(b) Our past experience, though greatly facilitating new acquisitions, is not the measure of our possible knowledge. Else the first act of knowledge would be inexplicable, and all revelation of higher characters to lower would be precluded, as well as all progress to knowledge, which surpasses our present attainments.

(c) Even if knowledge depended upon similarity of nature and experience, we might still know God, since we are made in God?s image, and there are important analogies between the divine nature and our own.

(a) The dictum of Empedocles, ?Similia similibus percipiuntur,? must be supplemented by a second dictum, ?Similia dissemilibus percipiuntur.? All things are alike, in being objects. But knowing is distinguishing, and there must be contrast between objects to awaken our attention. God knows sin, though it is the antithesis to his holy being. The ego knows the non ? ego. We cannot know even self, without objectifying it, distinguishing it from its thoughts, and regarding it as another.

(b) Versus Herbert Spencer, First Principles, 79-82 ? ?Knowledge is recognition and classification.? But we reply that a thing must first he perceived in order to be recognized or compared with something else; and this is as true of the first sensation as of the later and more definite forms of knowledge ? indeed there is no sensation which does not involve, as its complement, an at least incipient perception; see Sir William Hamilton Metaphysics, 351, 352; Porter, Human Intellect, 206.

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