upon subjective conditions, are not simply ?judgments of worth? or ?value ? judgments,? ? they give us the knowledge of ?things in themselves..? Edward Caird says of his brother John Caird (Fund. Ideas of Christianity, Introduction cxxi) ? ?The conviction that God can be known and is known, and that, in the deepest sense, all our knowledge is knowledge of him, was the corner ? stone of his theology.?

Ritschl?s phenomenalism is allied to the positivism of Comte, who regarded all so ? called knowledge of other than phenomenal objects as purely negative. The phrase ?Positive Philosophy? implies indeed that all knowledge of mind is negative; see Comte, Pos. Philosophy, Martineau?s translation, 26, 28, 33 ? ?In order to observe, your intellect must pause from activity ? yet it is this very activity you want to observe. If you cannot effect the cause, you cannot observe; if you do effect it, there is nothing to observe.? ?This view is refuted by the two facts:

(1) consciousness, mind and

(2) memory for consciousness is the knowing of the self side by side with the knowing of its thoughts, and memory is the knowing of the self side by side with the knowing of its past; see Martineau, Essays Philos. and Theol., 1:24- 40, 207-212. By phenomena we mean ?facts, in distinction from their ground, principle, or law??; ?neither phenomena nor qualities, as such, are perceived, but objects. percepts, or beings; and it is by an after ? thought or reflex process that these are connected as qualities and are referred to as substances?; see Porter, Human Intellect, 51, 238, 520 , 619-637, 640-645.

Phenomena may be internal, e.g., thoughts; in this case the noumenom is the mind, of which these thoughts are the, manifestations. Or, phenomena may be external, e. g., color, hardness, shape, and size; in this case the noumenon is matter, of which these qualities are the manifestations. But qualities, whether mental or material, imply the existence of a substance to which they belong: they can no more be conceived of as existing apart from substance, than the upper side of a plank can be conceived of as existing without an under side; see Bowne, Review of Herbert Spencer, 47, 207-217; Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory, 1; 455, 456 ? ?Comte?s assumption that mind cannot know itself or its states is exactly balanced by Kant?s assumption that mind cannot know anything outside of itself... It is precisely because all knowledge is of relations that it is not and cannot be of phenomena alone. The absolute cannot per se be known, because in being known it would ipso facto enter into relations and be absolute no more. But neither can the phenomenal per se be known, i.e., be known as phenomenal without simultaneous cognition of what is non

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