have the cataract removed from his eyes by some competent oculist, so, in order to any complete or satisfactory theology, the veil must be taken away from the heart by God himself ( cf. <470315>2 Corinthians 3:15, 16 ? a veil lieth upon their heart But whensoever it [margin ?a man?] shall turn to the Lord, the veil is taken away?).
Our doctrine that faith is knowledge and the highest knowledge is to be distinguished from that of Ritschl, whose theology is an appeal to the heart to the exclusion of the head ? to fiducia without notitia . But fiducia includes notitia else it is blinding, irrational and unscientific. Robert Browning, in like manner, fell into a deep speculative error, when, in order to substantiate his optimistic faith, he stigmatized human knowledge as merely apparent. The appeal of both Ritschl and Browning from the head to the heart should rather be an appeal from the narrower knowledge of the mere intellect to the larger knowledge conditioned upon right affection. See A. H. Strong, The: Great Poets aced their Theology. 441. Ore Ritschl?s postulates, see Stearns, Evidence of Christian Experience, 274-280, and Pfleiderer, Die Ritschl?sche Theologie. On the relation of love and will to knowledge, see Kaftan, in Am. Jour. Theology, 1900:717; Hovey, Manual Christ. Theol., 9; Foundations of our Faith, 12, 13; Shedd, Hist. Doct., 1:154-164; Presb. Quar., Oct. 1871, Oct. 1872, Oct. 1873; Calderwood, Philos. Infinite, 99, 117; Van Oosterzee, Dogmatics, 2-8; New Englander, July, 1873:481; Princeton Rev., 1864:122; Christlieb, Mod. Doubt, 124, 125: Grau, Glaube als hochste Vernunft, in Beweis des Glaubens, 1865:110 Dorner, Gesch. prot. Theol., 228; Newman, Univ. Sermons, 206 ; Hinton, Art of Thinking, Introduction by Hodgson, 5.
2. In the capacity of the human m/nd for knowing God and certain of these relations ? But it has urged that such knowledge is impossible for the following reasons:
A. Because we can know only phenomena. We reply:
(a) We know mental as well as physical phenomena.
(b) In knowing phenomena, whether mental or physical, we know substance as underlying the phenomena, as manifested thorough them, and as constituting their ground of unity.
(c) Our minds bring to the observation of phenomena not only this knowledge of substance, but also knowledge of time, space, cause, and right, realities which are in no sense phenomenal. Since these objects of
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