current of a man?s life. Yet he held that we have no consciousness of the power of a contrary choice. Consciousness can testify only to what springs out of the moral nature, not to the moral nature itself.
Lotze, Religionsphilosophie, section 61 ? ?An indeterminate choice is, of course, incomprehensible and inexplicable. If it were comprehensible and explicable by the human intellect, if, that is, it could be seen to follow necessarily from the preexisting conditions it, from the nature of the case, could not be a morally free choice at all. But we cannot comprehend any more how the mind can move the muscles nor how a moving stone can set another stone in motion nor how the Absolute calls into existence our individual selves.? Upton, Hibbert Lectures, 308-327, gives an able expose of the deterministic fallacies. He cites Martineau and Balfour in England, Renouvier and Fonsegrive in France, Edward Zeller, Kuno Fischer and Saarschmidt in Germany, and William James in America, as recent advocates of free will.
Martineau, Study, 2:227 ? ?Is there not a Causal Self, over and above the Caused Self, or rather the Caused State and contents of the self left as a deposit from previous behavior? Absolute idealism, like Green?s, will not recognize the existence of this Causal Self?; Study of Religion, 2:195- 324, and especially 240 ? ?Where two or more rival preconceptions enter the field together, they cannot compare themselves inter se ; they need and meet a superior. It rests with the mind itself to decide. The decision will not be unmotivated for it will have its reasons. It will not be uncomfortable to the characteristics of the mind for it will express its preferences. None the less, it is issued by a free cause that elects from among the conditions and is not elected by them.? 241 ? ?So far from admitting that different effects cannot come from the same cause, I even venture on the paradox that nothing, which is limited to one effect, is a proper cause.? 309 ? ?Freedom, in the sense of option and will and as the power of deciding an alternative, has no place in the doctrines of the German schools.? 311 ? ?The whole illusion of Necessity springs from the attempt to fling out, for contemplation in the field of Nature, the creative new beginnings centered in personal subjects that transcend it.?
See also H. B. Smith, System of Christ. Theol., 236-251; Mansel, Proleg. Log., 113-155, 270-278, and Metaphysics, 366; Gregory, Christian Ethics, 60; Abp. Manning, in Contem. Rev., Jan. 1871:468; Ward, Philos. of Theism, 1:287-352; 2:1-79, 274-349; Bp. Temple, Bampton Lect., 1884:69-96; Row, Man not a Machine, in Present Day Tracts, 5:no. 30; Richards, Lectures on Theology, 97-153; Solly, The Will, 167- 203; William James, The Dilemma of Determinism, in Unitarian Review,
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