concept is not a mental image ? only the percept is. Lotze: ?Color in general is not representable by any image; it looks neither green nor red, but has no look whatever.? The generic horse has no particular color, though the individual horse may be black, white, or bay. So Sir William Hamilton speaks of ?the unpicturable notions of the intelligence.?
Martineau, Religion and Materialism.39, 40 ? ?This doctrine of Nescience stands in exactly the same relation to causal power, whether you construe it as Material Force or as Divine Agency. Neither can be observed ; one or the other must be assumed. If you admit to the category of knowledge only what we learn from observation, particular or generalized, then is Force unknown; if you extend the word to what is imported by the intellect itself into our cognitive acts, to make them such, then is God known.? Matter, ether, energy, protoplasm, organism, lire, ? no one of these can be portrayed to time imagination; yet Mr. Spencer deals with them as objects of Science. If these are not inscrutable, why should he regard the Power that gives unity to all things as inscrutable?
Herbert Spencer is not in fact consistent with himself, for in divers parts of his writings he calls time inscrutable Reality back of phenomena the one, eternal, ubiquitous, infinite, ultimate, absolute Existence, Power and Cause. ?It seems,? says Father Dalgairns, ?that a great deal is known about the Unknowable.? Chadwick, Unitarianism, 75 ? ?The beggar phrase ?Unknowable? becomes, after Spencer?s repeated designations of it, as rich as Croesus with all saving knowledge.? Matheson: ?To know that we know nothing is already to have reached a fact of knowledge.? If Mr. Spencer intended to exclude God from the realm of Knowledge, he should first have excluded him from the realm of Existence; for to grant that he is, is already to grant that we not only may know him, but that we actually to some extent do know him; see D. J. Hill, Genetic Philosophy, 22; McCosh, Intuitions, 186-189 (Eng. ed.. 214); Murphy, Scientific Bases, 133; Bowne, Review of Spencer, 30-34; New Englander, July, 1875:54, 543, 544; Oscar Craig, in Presb. Rev., July, 1883:594-602.
D. Because we can know truly only that which we know in whole and not in part. We reply:
(a) The objection confounds partial knowledge with the knowledge of a part. We know the mind in part, but we do not know a part of the mind.
(b) If the objection were valid, no real knowledge of anything would be possible, since we know no single thing in all its relations. We conclude that, although God is a being not composed of parts, we may yet have a
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