himself ? if he will. Armenian grace is evenly bestowed grace of spiritual endowment, as Pelagian grace is evenly bestowed grace of creation. It regards redemption as a compensation for innate and consequently irresponsible depravity.

(d) In the Armenian system, the order of salvation is, (1) faith by a non- renewed but convicted man, (2) justification, (3) regeneration, or a holy heart. God decrees not to originate faith, but to reward it. Hence Wesleyans make faith a work, and regard election as God?s ordaining those who, he foresees, will of their own accord believes. The Augustinian order, on the contrary, is (1) regeneration, (2) faith, and (3) justification. Memoir of Adolph Saphir, 255 ? ?My objection to the Armenian or semi-Armenian is not that they make the entrance very wide but that they do not give you anything definite, safe and real, when you have entered. Do not believe the devil?s gospel, which is a chance of salvation; chance of salvation is chance of damnation.? Grace is not a reward for good deeds done but a power enabling us to do them. Francis Rous of Truro, in the Parliament of l629, spoke as a man nearly frantic with horror at the increase of that ?error of Armenianism which makes the grace of God lackey it after the will of man?; see Masson, Life of Milton, 1:277. Armenian converts say: ?I gave my heart to the Lord?, Augustinian converts say: ?The Holy Spirit convicted me of sin and renewed my heart.? Armenianism tends to self-sufficiency, Angustinianism promotes dependence upon God.

C. It rests upon false philosophical principles, as for example:

(a) the will is simply the faculty of volition,

(b) the power of contrary choice, in the sense of power by a single act to reverse one?s moral state, is essential to will,

(c) previous certainty of any given moral act is incompatible with its freedom.

(d) That ability is the measure of obligation,

(e) law condemns only volitional transgression and

(f) man has no organic moral connection with the race.

(b) Raymond says: ?Man is responsible for character but only so far as that character is self-imposed. We are not responsible for character irrespective of its origin. Freedom from an act is as essential to responsibility as freedom to it. If power to the contrary is impossible, then

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