previously certain, though not necessary, the future good or evil action of the man. Thus, while the will is free, the man may be the ?bondservant of sin? ( <430831>John 8:31-36) or the ?servant of righteousness? ( <450615>Romans 6:15- 23; cf. Hebrews 12-23 ? ?spirits ofjust men made perfect?).

(b) Man is responsible for all effects of will, as well as for will itself. He is responsible for voluntary affections as well as for voluntary acts and for the intellectual views into which will entered. He is responsible as well for the acts of will by which these views have been formed in the past or are maintained in the present ( <600305>1 Peter 3:5 ? ?wilfully forget?).

Ladd, Philosophy of Knowledge, 415 ? ?The self stands between the two laws of Nature and of Conscience and, under perpetual limitations from both, exercises its choice. Thus it becomes more and more enslaved by the one or more and more free by habitually choosing to follow the other. Our conception of causality according to the laws of nature, and our conception of the other causality of freedom, are both derived from one and the same experience of the self. There arises a seeming antinomy only when we hypostatize each severally and apart from the other.? R. T. Smith, Man?s Knowledge of Man and of God, 69 ? ?Making a will is significant. Here the action of will is limited by conditions: the amount of the testator?s property, the number of his relatives, the nature of the objects of bounty within his knowledge.?

Harris, Philos. Basis of Theism, 349-407 ? ?Action without motives, or contrary to all motives, would be irrational action. Instead of being free, it would be like the convulsions of epilepsy. Motives = sensibilities. Motive is not cause ; it does not determine; it is only influence. Yet determination is always made under the influence of motives. Uniformity of action is not to be explained by law of uniform influence of motives but by character in the will. By its choice, will forms, in it, a character by actions in accordance with this choice, confirms and develops the character. Choice modifies sensibilities and so modifies motives. Volitional action expresses character but also forms and modifies it. Man may change his choice yet intellect, sensibility, motive, habit remain. Evil choice, having formed intellect and sensibility into accord with itself, must be a powerful hindrance to fundamental change by new and contrary choice and gives small ground to expect that man left to himself ever will make the change. After will has acquired character by choices, its determinations are not transitions from complete indetermination or indifference but are more or less expressions of character already formed. The theory that indifference is essential to freedom implies that will never acquires character;

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