be atoned for. To say that the child inherits a sinful nature, not as penalty, but by natural law, is to ignore the fact that this natural law is simply the regular action of God, the expression of his moral nature, and so is itself penalty.

?Man kills a snake,? says Raymond, ?because it is a snake, and not because it is to blame for being a snake,? which seems to us a new proof that the advocates of innocent depravity regard infants, not as moral beings, but as mere animals. ?We must distinguish automatic excellence or badness,? says Raymond again, ?from moral desert, whether good or ill.? This seems to us a doctrine of punishment without guilt. Princeton Essays, 1:138, quote Coleridge: ?It is an outrage on common sense to affirm that it is no evil for men to be placed on their probation under such circumstances that not one of ten thousand millions ever escapes sin and condemnation to eternal death. There is evil inflicted on us, as a consequence of Adam?s sin, antecedent to our personal transgressions. It matters not what this evil is, whether temporal death, corruption of nature, certainty of sin, or death in its more extended sense if the ground of the evil?s coming on us is Adam?s sin, the principle is the same.? Baird, Elohim Revealed, 488 ? So, it seems, ?if a creature is punished, it implies that some one has sinned, but does not necessarily intimate the sufferer to be the sinner! But this is wholly contrary to the argument of the apostle in <450512>Romans 5:12-19, which is based upon the opposite doctrine and it is also contrary to the justice of God, who punishes only those who deserve it.? See Julius Muller, Doct. Sin, 2:67-74.

D. Its limitation of responsibility to the evil choices of the individual and the dispositions caused thereby is inconsistent with the following facts:

(a) The first moral choice of each individual is so involuntary as not to be remembered. Put forth at birth, as the chief advocates of the New School theory maintain, it does not answer to their definition of sin as a voluntary transgression of known law. Responsibility for such choice does not differ from responsibility for the inborn evil state of the will, which manifests itself in that choice.

(b) The uniformity of sinful action among men cannot be explained by the existence of a mere faculty of choices. That men should uniformly choose may be thus explained but that men should uniformly choose evil requires us to postulate an evil tendency or state of the will itself, prior to these separate acts of choice. This evil tendency or inborn determination to evil,

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