and of God. He was unconsciously making a powerful appeal to the will and the human will responded in prolonged and might efforts; see Allen, Jonathan Edwards, 109.
For references, and additional statements with regard to the will and its freedom, see chapter on Decrees, pages 361, 362, and article by A. H. Strong, in Baptist Review, 1883:219-242, and reprinted in Philosophy and Religion, 114-128. In the remarks upon the Decrees, we have intimated our rejection of the Armenian liberty of indifference, or the doctrine that the will can act without motive. See this doctrine advocated in Peabody, Moral Philosophy, 1-9. But we also reject the theory of determinism propounded by Jonathan Edwards (Freedom of the Will, in Works, vol. 2). This, as we have before remarked, identifies sensibility with the will, regards affections as the efficient causes of volition and speaks of the connection between motive and action as a necessary one. Hazard, Man a creative First Cause, and the Will, 407 ? ?Edwards gives to the controlling cause of volition in the past the name of motive. He treats the inclination as a motive, but he also makes inclination synonymous with choice and will, which would make will to be only the soul willing and therefore, the cause of its own act.? For objections to the Armenian theory, see H. B. Smith, Review of Whedon, in Faith and Philosophy, 359-399; McCosh, Divine government, 263-318, esp. 312; E.
G. Robinson, Principles and Practice of Morality, 109-137; Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, 2:115-147.
James, Psychology, 1:139 ? ?Consciousness is primarily a selecting agency.? 2:393 ? ?Man possesses all the instincts of animals, and a great many more besides. Reason, per se , can inhibit no impulses; the only thing that can neutralize an impulse is an impulse the other way. Reason may however make an inference which will excite the imagination to let loose the impulse the other way.? 549 ? ?Ideal or moral action is action in the line of the greatest resistance.? 562 ? ?Effort of attention is the essential phenomenon of will.? 567 ? ?The terminus of the psychological process is volition. It is the point to which the will is directly applied is always an idea.? 568 ? ?Though attention is the first thing in volition, express consent to the reality of what is attended to is an additional and distinct phenomenon. We say not only that it is a reality but we also say: ?Let it be a reality.? 571 ? ?Are the duration and intensity of this effort fixed functions of the object or are they not? We answer, no, and so we maintain freedom of the will.? 584 ? ?The soul presents nothing, creates nothing and is at the mercy of Material forces for all possibilities. By reinforcing one and checking others, it figures not as an epiphenomenon but as something from which the play gets moral support.? Alexander,
<- Previous Table of Contents Next ->
Was this article helpful?