consequence. He concluded before the end of his journey that he, at any rate, had been predestinated to be a fool and that he had made his calling and election sure. Ladd, Philosophy of Conduct, 146, 187, shows that the will is free, first, by man?s consciousness of ability, and, secondly, by man?s consciousness of imputability. By nature, he is potentially self- determining; as matter of fact, he often becomes self-determining.
Allen, Religious Progress, 110 ? ?The coming church must embrace the sovereignty of God and the freedom of the will which are total depravity and the divinity of human nature, the unity of God and the triune distinctions in the Godhead, gnosticism and agnosticism, the humanity of Christ and his incarnate deity, the freedom of the Christian man and the authority of the church, individualism and solidarity, reason and faith, science and theology, miracle and uniformity of law, culture and piety, the authority of the Bible as the word of God with absolute freedom of Biblical criticism, the gift of administration as in the historic episcopate and the gift of prophecy as the highest sanction of the ministerial commission and the apostolic succession but also the direct and immediate call, which knows only the succession of the Holy Ghost.? Without assenting to these latter clauses we may commend the comprehensive spirit of this utterance, especially with reference to the vexed question of the relation of divine sovereignty to human freedom.
It may aid us, in estimating the force of this objection, to note the four senses in which the term ?freedom? may be used. It may be used as equivalent to
(1) physical freedom, or absence of outward constraint;
(2) formal freedom, or a state of moral indetermination;
(3) moral freedom, or self-determination in view of motives;
(4) real freedom, or ability to conform to the divine standard.
With the first of these we are not now concerned, since all agree that the decrees lay no outward constraint upon men. Freedom in the second sense has no existence, since all men have character. Free agency, or freedom in the third sense, has just been shown to be consistent with the decrees. Freedom in the fourth sense, or real freedom, is the special gift of God, and is not to be confounded with free agency. The objection mentioned above rests wholly upon the second of these definitions of free agency. This we have shown to be false, and with this the objection itself falls to the ground.
Ritschl, Justification and Reconciliation, 133-188, gives a good definition of (his fourth kind of freedom: ?Freedom is self-determination by
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