Bowne, Metaphysics, 432 ? ?How the possibility of an odor and a flavor can be the cause of the yellow color of an orange is probably unknowable, except to a mind that can see that two and two may make five.? See Iverach?s Philosophy of Spencer Examined, in Present Day Tracts, 5: no. 29. Martineau, Study, 1:102-112 ? ?If external impressions are telegraphed to the brain, intelligence must receive the message at the beginning as well as deliver it at the end...It is the external object which gives the possibility, not the possibility which gives the external object. The mind cannot make both its cognita and its cognitio. It cannot dispense with standing ground for its own feet, or with atmosphere for its own wings.? Professor Charles A. Strong: ?Kant held to things-in-themselves back of physical phenomena, as well as to things-in-themselves back of mental phenomena; he thought things-in-themselves back of physical might be identical with things-in-themselves back of mental phenomena. And since mental phenomena, on this theory, are not specimens of reality, and reality manifests itself indifferently through them and through physical phenomena, he naturally concluded that we have no ground for supposing reality to be like either ? that we must conceive of it as ?weder Materie noch ein denkend Wesen? ? ? neither matter nor a thinking being? ? a theory of the Unknowable. Would that it had been also the Unthinkable and the Unmentionable!? Ralph Waldo Emmerson was a sub- jective idealist; but, when called to inspect a farmer?s load of wood, he said to his company: ?Excuse me a moment, my friends; we have to attend to these matters, just as if they were real.? See Mivart, On Truth, 71-14 1.
2. Its definition of mind as a ?series of feelings aware of itself?
contradicts our intuitive judgment that, in knowing the phenomena of mind, we have direct knowledge of a spiritual substance of which these phenomena are manifestations, which retains its identity independently of our consciousness, and which, in its knowing, instead of being the passive recipient of impressions from without, always acts from within by a power of its own.
James, Psychology, 1:226 ? ?It seems as if the elementary psychic fact were not thought, or this thought, or that thought, but my thought, every thought being owned. The universal conscious fact is not ?feelings and thoughts exist,? but ?I think,? and ?I feel.?? Professor James is compelled to say this, even though he begins his Psychology without insisting upon the existence of a soul. Hamilton?s Reid, 443 ? ?Shall I think that thought can stand by itself? or that ideas can feel pleasure or pain?? R.T. Smith, Man?s Knowledge, 44 ? ?We say ?my notions and my passions,?
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