space. The notion that space and the divine immensity are identical leads to a materialistic conception of God. Space is not an attribute of God, as Clarke maintained, and no argument for the divine existence can be constructed from this premise (see pages 85, 86). Martineau, Types, 1:138, 139, 170 ? ?Malebranche said that God is the place of all spirits, as space is the place of all bodies? Descartes held that there is no such thing as empty space. Nothing cannot possibly have extension. Wherever extension is, there must be something extended. Hence the doctrine of a plenum, A vacuum is inconceivable.? Lotze, Outlines of Metaphysics, 87 ? ?According to the ordinary view? space exists, and things exist in it; according to our view, only things exist, and between them nothing exists, but space exists in them.?

Case, Physical Realism, 379, 380 ? ?Space is the continuity, or continuous extension of the universe as one substance.? Ladd: ?Is space extended? Then it must be extended in some other space. That other space is the space we are talking about. Space then is not an entity, but a mental presupposition of the existence of extended substance. Space and time are neither finite nor infinite. Space has neither circumference nor center ? its center would be everywhere. We cannot imagine space at all. It is simply a precondition of mind enabling us to perceive things.? In Bibliotheca Sacra, 1890:415-444, art., Is Space a Reality? Prof. Mead opposes the doctrine that space is purely subjective, as taught by Bowne; also the doctrine that space is a certain order of relations among realities; that space is nothing apart from things; but that things, when they exist, exist in certain relations, and that the sum, or system, of these relations constitutes space.

We prefer the view of Bowne, Metaphysics 127, 137, 143, that ?Space is the form of objective experience, and is nothing in abstraction from that experience? it is a form of intuition, and not a mode of existence. According to this view, things are not in space and space-relations, but appear to be. In themselves they are essentially non-spatial; but by their interactions with one another, and with the mind, they give rise to the appearance of a world of extended things in a common space. Space- predicates, then, belong to phenomena only, and not to things in themselves? apparent reality exists spatially; but proper ontological reality exists spacelessly and without spatial predicates.? For the view that space is relative, see also Cocker, Theistic Conception of the World, 66-96; Calderwood, Philos. of the Infinite, 331-335. Per contra, see Porter, Human Intellect, 662; Hazard, Letters on Causation in Willing, appendix; Bibliotheca Sacra, Oct. 1877:723; Gear, in Bap. Rev., July, 1880:434; Lowndes, Philos. of Primary Beliefs, 144-161.

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