direction of the will is self-imparted? that the will is free. That is to say, it is, not constrained by causes exterior, which is fatalism ? and not a mere spontaneity, confined to one path by force acting from within, which is determinism . It is immediately evident to every unsophisticated mind. We can initiate action by an efficiency, which is neither irresistibly controlled by motives, nor determined without any capacity of alternative action by proneness inherent in its nature. Motives have an influence, but influence is not to be confounded with causal efficiency.?

Talbot, on Will and Free Will, Bap. Rev., July, 1582 ? ?Will is neither a power of unconditioned self-determination, which is not freedom but an aimless, irrational, fatalistic power nor pure spontaneity, which excludes from will all law but its own. It is rather a power of originating action ? a power which is limited however by inborn dispositions, by acquired habits and convictions, by feelings and social relations.? Ernest Naville, in Rev. Chretienne, Jan. 1878:7 ? ?Our liberty does not consist in producing an action of which it is the only source. It consists in choosing between two preexistent impulses. It is choice , not creation , that is our destiny ? a drop of water that can choose whether it will go into the Rhine or the Rhone. Gravity carries it down ? it chooses only its direction. Impulses do not come from the will, but from the sensibility but free will chooses between these impulses.? Bowne, Metaphysics, 169 ?Freedom is not a power of acting without, or apart from, motives but simply a power of choosing an end or law and of governing one?s self accordingly.? Porter, Moral Science, 77-111, Will has ?not the power to choose without motive.? It ?does not exclude motives to the contrary.? Volition ?supposes that there are two or more objects between which election is made. It is an act of preference, and to prefer implies that one motive is chosen to the exclusion of another? to the conception and the act two motives at least are required.? Lyall, Intellect, Emotions, and Moral Nature, 581, 592 ? ?The will follows reasons, inducements but it is not caused . It obeys or acts under inducement, but it does so sovereignly. It exhibits the phenomena of activity, in relation to the very motive it obeys. It obeys it rather than another. It determines, in reference to it, that this is the very motive it will obey. There is undoubtedly this phenomenon exhibited: the will obeying but elective and active in its obedience. If it be asked how this is possible ? how the will can be under the influence of motive and yet possess an intellectual activity, we reply that this is one of those ultimate phenomena which must be admitted while they cannot be explained.?

F. Will and responsibility.

(a) By repeated acts of will put forth in a given moral direction, the affections may become so confirmed in evil or in good as to make

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