phenomena of time; this double transcendence involves the complete supernatural character of man.? New World, 1892:152 ? ?It is not the character, but the self that has the character, to which the ultimate moral decision is due.? William Ernest Henly, Poems, 119 ? ?It Matters not how strait the gate, How charged with punishments the scroll, I am the master of my fate, I am the captain of my soul.?

Julius Muller, Doctrine of Sin, 2:54 ? ?A being is free, in so far as the inner center of its life, from which it acts, is conditioned by self- determination. It is not enough that the deciding agent in an act be the man himself, his own nature, and his distinctive character. In order to accountability, we must have more than this; we must prove that this, his distinctive nature and character springs from his own volition and that it is itself the product of freedom in moral development. <401233>Matthew 12:33 ? ?make the tree good, and its fruit good? ? combines both. Acts depend upon nature but nature again depends upon the primary decisions of the will (?make the tree good?). Some determinism is not denied but it is partly limited [by the will?s remaining power of choice] and partly traced back to a former self-determining.? Ibid., 67 ? ?If freedom be the self-determining of the will from that which is undetermined, Determinism is found wanting, because in its most spiritual form, though it grants a self-determination of the will, it is only such a one as springs from a determinates already present; indifference is found wanting too, because while it maintains indetermination as presupposed in every act of will. It does not recognize an actual self-determining on the part of the will, which, though it be a self-determining, yet begets determination of character. We must, therefore, hold the doctrine of a conditional and limited freedom,?

E. Will and contrary choice.

(a) Though no act of pure will is possible, the soul may put forth single volition in a direction opposed to its previous ruling purpose and thus far man has the power of a contrary choice ( <450718>Romans 7:18 ? ?to will is present with me?).

(b) But in so far as will has entered into and revealed itself in permanent states of intellect and sensibility and in a settled bent of the will itself, man cannot by a single act reverse his moral state, and in this respect has not the power of a contrary choice.

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