1 I have used the English translations to refer to those two works repeatedly mentioned: The

Intentions of the Philosophers (Maqâsid al-falâsifa) and the Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tahâfut al-falâsifa). Elsewhere I have stayed with Arabic titles.

2 From 'Ali b, Sultân"s commentary on Qâtt' ty3^ ^"'^Istanbul AH 1299,11:509.

Reference taken from I.Goldziher, Introduction to Islamic Theology and Law, Trans. A. and R.Hamori, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981, 159, n. 138.

3 See Watt 1953.

4 In his 1927 edition, Bouyges dated the completion of the Incoherence to 11 Muharram, 488

AH, or January 22, 1095, based on a note in a manuscript. MacDonald agreed with this estimation, based on his chronology of Ghazzâlî's life. This led some to date the completion of the Intentions to a slightly earlier time, since it describes itself as an introduction to the Incoherence. Accordingly, C.Lohr dates the completion of the Intentions to 487/1094. There is, however, no direct evidence for such a dating. See MacDonald 1936, 10 and C.Lohr 1965, 226.

5 Ghazzâlî tells us that he left Baghdad in 488/1095, having completed two years individual philosophical studies. For a general overview of his life in Ghazzâlî's own words, see Watt 1953. For a more critical and topical look at Ghazzâlî see Lazarus Yafeh 1975.

6 The Dânesh nâmeh is Ibn Sînâ's comprehensive work on Aristotelian philosophy, although it is not a direct translation of any Hellenistic work. The correspondance of this work and the Intentions is striking, including with the enigmatic fifth article of the Physics of the Intentions (see below). See Ibn Sînâ, Dânesh nâmeh, ed. Ahmed Khorâsânî, Tehran 1315/1937. See also Avicenne, Le Livre de science, trans. Mohammad Achena and Henri Massé, Paris 1955 and J.Janssens, "Le Dânesh nâmeh d'Ibn Sînâ: un texte à revoir?" Bulletin de philosophic médiévale, 28 (1986), 163-177.

7 Quoted from the translation of the prologue of the Intentions in MacDonald 1936, 11.

8 Ibn Rushd's quotation of Ghazzâlî was in fact the route by which the Tahâfut al-falâsifa reached medieval Europe. For the textual tradition of the Tahâfut al-falâsifa, see Steinschneider 1893, 326-327.

9 Gundissalinus was the same scholar who translated Ibn Sînâ's De Anima, and many another works (Steinschneider 1893, 299). He seems to have worked usually with an Arabic speaking Jewish scholar, Avendauth, or others that could translate the Arabic into Castilian. He would then translate the Castilian into Latin. See C.Lohr 1965, 228-9.

10 According to C.Lohr, three manuscripts contain both of their names, while one manuscript and the Venice printed edition contain only the name of Dominicus (p. 229). Algazel is the Latinized form of Al-Ghazzâlî.

11 See Lohr 1965, 229.

The influences of it are evident in the works of Roger Bacon, Ramon Lull, Raymond Martin, Ockham, and others. See Lohr 1965, 231.

The Tahâfut was not translated into Latin until the fifteenth century and then only in conjunction with the Tahâfut al-tahâfut of Ibn Rushd, who quoted the former in its entirety. See C.Lohr 1969 and Wilms 1966, 20.

Among others, Alexander Neckam, Willhelm von Auvergne, Bartholomeus Anglicus, Dietrich von Freiburg, Berthold von Mosburg and M.Grabmann all dealt with al-Ghazzâlî as a philosopher. Giles of Romes includes him in the following list of heretical philosophers: Aristotelis, Averrois, Avicennae, Algazelis, Alkindi and Rabbi Moysis. See Wilms 1966, 20. For Martin, See A.Bertheir, "Un maître orientaliste du xiiie siècle: Raymond Martin O.P.," Archivum Fratrum Paedicatorum, 6 (1936), 267-311. Most important is his Pugio fidei. See for example the comparisons that D.Salman makes between Bacon's use of Ghazzâlî earlier in Quaestiones supra undecimum Primae Philosophiae Aristotelis and later in his Communia naturalium. See Salman 1935-36, 115, 111.

That Giles of Rome was attacking the Intentions was convincingly proven by M.Bouyges, who showed how the order of refutations in the Errores philosophorum matches the order of propositions in the Intentions of the Philosophers. See Bouyges 1921, 404-406.

See Lohr 1965, 231.

See Steinschneider 1893, 299.

See I.Husik, A History of Medieaval Jewish Philosophy. Philadelphia 1946, 152ff. See Lohr 1965, 231.

See for example Lohr 1965, 228. For a longer look at the nature of Albaleg's version, see Auerbach 1906.

"An manchen Stellen, je nach der Wichtigkeit des Gegenstandes, breiten sich die Noten aus oder losen sich vom Text ab, so dass sie selbstandige Excurse werden." (Steinschneider 1893, 302).

"Ibn Roschd hat auf diese Angriffe geantwortet, und die Stellen der Irrtümer und Sophismen hervorgehoben; Alb. will an einigen Stellen ein Gleiches thun [sic]." Ibid.

Albalag accuses Ghazzâlî of misrepresenting philosophers, for "in Wahrheit habe er nicht ihre Ansichten, sondern die seinigen gegeben" (Steinschneider 1893, 303).

As Ghazzâlî would later explain in the Tahâfut, he admired both (and only) al-Fârâbî and Ibn

Sînâ for their correct rendering of classical philosophical arguments, even when he considered such arguments mistaken. With this reflection we can better appreciate the thread of this tradition, which began with Aristotle, continued with Ibn Sînâ and then stretched to

Albalag, Roger Bacon and others, with many twists and knots along the way.

From the Munqidh min al-dalâlin Watt 1953, 29-30.

See for example, D.B.MacDonald 1899, 103.

p. 21 of the Cairo 1303 edition, as referenced by MacDonald.

MacDonald 1899, 98.

M.Marmura, Introduction to Ghazzâlî, The Incoherence of the Philosophers, Provo, Utah 1997, xxiii.

Marmura's argument is not overwhelmingly convincing. In fact, both the Iqtisâdand the are engaged in the same task of building up a theological system (specifically, an A ft)'an system).

Among them is Moshe Narboni. See M.Narboni, Commentary on the Guide to the Perplexed, ed. M.Hayoun, Tübingen 1986. See L.E.Goodman's review of the work in the Jewish Quarterly Review 81(1990), 161-5.

See for example, the article on "Gazzâlî" by G.Böwering to be published in Encyclopaedia Iranica.

36 In placing the Metaphysics before the Physics, Ghazzâlî is conspicuously diverging from the vast majority of philosophical treatises, where the Physics is a logical antecedent to the Metaphysics. The Physics is usually a space to establish those theses that will be useful in the Metaphysics, the ultimate focus of the work. Ghazzâlî agrees with the focus on metaphysics, calling it the object (maqsid) of science. Yet, he sees no need to postpone its treatment, suggesting that the philosophers only did so because of its "abstruseness" (MacDonald 1936, 12). MacDonald theorizes that Ghazzâlî approached the work as he learned the topics, for a theologian "would naturally look first into theology and, then, hark back for explanations to physics" (Ibid.). A simple look at the DâneshNâmeh, however, would avert the need for such speculation. Ghazzâlî is simply following the method of Ibn Sînâ, as he does throughout the work, as the Dânesh nâmeh proceeds in the same unusual order, with the addition of a section on mathematics at the end.

37 Lohr provides a listing of all Latin manuscripts of the Intentions of the Philosophers. He lists the sections that are included in each one and the order in which they are included. See Lohr 1965, 232-236.

38 MacDonald, Isis 25, 14.

39 Maqâsidal-falâsifa, ed. S.Dunya, Cairo 1961, 371.

40 See MacDonald 1936, 12.

41 Logica et Philosophia (Venedig 1506), Introduction by C.Lohr, Frankfurt 1969.

42 E.Gräf, in a short and hardly noticed book review (Gräf 1960), was one of the few to detect an inconsistency with the traditional understanding of the Intentions. He brings out as evidence: one, the contrast between the prologue/ conclusion and the body of the text; two, that the introduction to the Incoherence is more properly found in Ghazzâlî's Miyarat- tlm

* three, that Ghazzâlî mentions other works in his autobiographical Munqidh min al-dalâl, such as the same ''m>yet he does not mention the Intentions; four

(and most interesting), that Ibn Rushd rightly states in his Tahâfut al-tahâfut that Ghazzâlî quoted Ibn Sîna correctly in the Intentions but incorrectly in the Incoherence. Gräf remarks, "Wäre ein solcher Lapsus denkbar, wenn die beiden Werke so eng zusammengehorten, wie Einleitung und Schluß der Maqâsid vorgeben?" (163). Gräf suggests that the Intentions was actually completed earlier than traditionally assumed, during Ghazzâlî's philosophical studies. Thanks to Dr. Frank Griffell for pointing out this reference.

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