Notes

1 For two glimpses of this contribution see Gersh 1978; Hankey 1980.

2 There has come to be an extensive literature on Proclus, most of it in the form of articles rather than monographs. The main bibliography for this literature is Muth 1993. The three most important monographs on Proclus are Trouillard 1972, Beierwaltes 1965, and Gersh 1973.

3 See for example Proclus, In Euclidem 3-5.

4 Lowry 1980, 85. The disagreement between a Procline and an Hegelian philosophy over whether the first principle should be self-thinking thought or the One is related to the disagreement about the nature of philosophical system itself. In Proclus the multiplicity of system is an expression of a prior unity which cannot be grasped on its own terms. Thinking creates its own categories in an attempt to explicate its source which both succeeds and fails. Hence the most proper name for the first principle of all is the One, because this name is the best symbol for the hidden and unspeakable unity that is the pole around which the multiple articulates itself. This is different from a philosophy in which the movement is the self-articulation of the first principle itself, as in Hegel.

5 Lowry is in fact referring to the henades huperousioi, not the henades which are the intelligibles in the autozoon and which are the genera of Being. His reading is again an Hegelianising reading, in which it would be natural to think of the first unities as beings. But for Proclus that which is multiple in principle comes before that which is multiple as determined. And so between the One and the intelligible genera come the first Limit, the first Unlimited, and the henads.

6 He speaks of triads because each is a triad of remaining, proceeding, and returning moments, which are the ubiquitous structuring principles of the Procline cosmos.

7 That there is a seven-fold division of the intellectual order indicates that Proclus is not following only the inner logic of dianoia. He most often does follow this logic, and his system usually unfolds in triads. But the intellectual hebdomad is likely drawn from the Chaldaean Oracles, which Proclus considers to be a higher revelation of the hidden secrets of divinity than dianoia. See Lewy 1978, and Festugière 1971.

8 See the discussion of the mixture of Forms at Proclus, In Parmenidem 768ff.

9 This dynamic coming forth of a multiplicity from a previous unity is forceably stated by

J.Trouillard. See Trouillard 1960, 86: "Le genre n'est pas seulement la raison efficace des ressemblances, mais aussi de l'infinie diversification des espèces et des individus. Car par l'apeiron qu'il contient uni à son peras it peut alimenter dans une ligne donnée les antithèses mutuelles des termes subordonnés. Et cette synthèse d'autre et de même forme la série appropriée ou le nombre connatural à chaque unité qualifiée... Cela ne signifie nullement que le genre soit ce qu'il produit en ce sense qu'il enfermerait d'avance l'idée distincte de ses participations. Celles-ci peuvent lui ressembler sans que lui leur ressemble. II faudrait plutôt dire qu'il les fonde selon tout leur être, parce qu'il a en lui beaucoup plus qu'il ne faut pour justifier leur apparition." See also Gersh 1973, 120-121.

10 Richard Sorabji, in Sorabji 1983, 137-156 makes a case for the position that the thought of Nous in Plotinus is prepositional. His argument is that where there is complexity of thought, there is predication. I do not find this convincing, for the following reasons. First, in the contemporary analytical context out of which Sorabji writes, propositional thought connotes more than complexity. It is usually understood, whether tacitly or explicitly, to involve a synthesis of terms. As I am arguing, in Neoplatonism thinking is not a synthesis, but rather a division of a prior unity. Hence the Kantian demand for a justification of a priori synthetic propositions is mistaken. Rather, it is the implicit grasp of the prior unity which alows the division which produces the multiplicity of terms in the first place. Further, for the position that the thought of Nous is propositional as a whole, including the intellectual moment, to have any real content it is necessary that there be a real difference between subject and predicate. Thus Nous would think a Form by thinking that it is something, and this something must be something else than the original Form if all of Nous ' thoughts are not to be analytic. But what would Nous think the Forms are other than themselves? Why is the conception that all of Nous' thoughts are of the form "X is X" more attractive than the conception that Nous ' thought is a non-propositional resting in itself. Finally, a proposition implies logical motion from the subject to the predicate, mediated by being. The mind moves from the concept of the subject, through the concept of being, to the concept of the predicate. The motion in Nous seems much more to be a unified splintering of Being itself which produces its own determinations, which then can stand as subjects and predicates for discursive thinking. Propositional thought is not such as to give rise to the original genera of Being, but the thought of Nous does in fact do this, according to Plotinus and Proclus. For this reason I think Sorabji is mistaken in calling the thought of Nous in Plotinus propositional.

11 Proclus, In Timaeum III.10.30; 15.11-15. These three triads are: father/power/ intellect; being/life/intellect; remaining/procession/return. Each triad is each of these three sets of moments. However, the structure is repeated on a higher level, so that the three intelligible triads themselves may be thought to follow these sets of moments.

12 For these two Chaldaean terms Festugière refers us to Lewy 1978, 129-131.

13 See Beierwaltes 1965, 196-200.

14 The procession of Time considered as a whole is a simple, undifferentiated, and regular motion, even if the procession of its participants is complex, differentiated and irregular motion. See Proclus, In Timaeum III.30.1 1ff.

15 The partial soul is the soul which animates a human body. It is called partial (merikê) because although on the one hand it can be considered an individual and a soul in its own right, on the other hand it is a part of and an image of the hypostasis of Soul as a whole. Both Nous and Soul as hypostases are such unified multiplicities in which the structure of the whole is mirrored in each part.

16 Proclus, In Alcibiadem 189.6-11; 192.2-5. See also C. Steel 1997.

17 Proclus, In Timaeum III.27.26-32. For a discussion of internal and external energeia in Plotinus, see Gerson 1993, 566ff.

18 Trouillard 1956, 70: "L'esprit n'infuse à l'âme aucune idée, mais, par l'irradiation de l'intelligible et la visée que l'âme dirige vers lui, nous engendrons notions et raisons."

19 See Proclus, In Parmenidem 74K in the edition of Steel, Rumbach, MacIsaac 1997, lines 687-698.

20 The status of speech and writing are of course controversial. For Proclus, they would be a divided image of dianoetic thought, analogous to the manner in which dianoia is a divided image of Nous.

21 See the discussion of analogia in Gersh 1973, 83-90.

22 Trouillard 1956, 71: "On échouera toujours tant qu'on voudra réaliser les idées platoniciennes ou plotiniennes come des structures que l'on pose devant soi. Ainsi projetées, elles perderont le caractère de présence concrete qu'on ne peut leur refuser. Elles seront des catégories, postulats ou des mythes. Elles ne peuvent etre ni construites ni données. Reste qu'elles soient des normes apercevantes et réalisantes, identiques à l'activité de l'esprit, que toute la vie de l'âme emploie sans jamais les égaler. C'est pourquoi les lstes d'idées peuvent d'étendre sans fin en laissant échapper l'essentiel. Plato n'en a donné que des exemples. Et, de nos jours, ceux qui ont voulu s'y essayer ont fait un travail caduc at décevant."

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