Notes

1 In crediting the theory to Plotinus, Macrobius refers to the treatise "On the Virtues" (Enneads

I.ii). But the extensive details of the theory that Macrobius relates cannot be found in Plotinus's text, while they can be found in Porphyry. The question of Macrobius's use of Porphyry on this particular issue is bound up with more general questions about Porphyry and Plotinus as sources for Macrobius, about which there is some controversy. For summaries and references, see Macrobius 1952, 28-29; 121, n. 5, and Gersh 1986, 2:508509, n. 91.

2 The critical edition is by Lamberz (Porphyry 1975). In this chapter I use an English translation by Thomas Davidson (Porphyry 1869), standardizing the names of the four virtues— courage, temperance, prudence, and justice—which Davidson translates inconsistently. Davidson's translation is based on the edition of the Greek text edited by Creuzer (in Plotinus 1855). In the notes I give the Greek text of Lamberz, citing by page and line numbers (e.g. 22:14-15).

3 Manuscript variations in the ordering of the "sentences" mean that Creuzer, and thus

Davidson, arrange them in a different order than the critical edition of Lamberz; the Lamberz "sentence" number 32, which takes up 139 lines, is Creuzer's number 34 (146 lines). The next longest of the "sentences" is number 40, with 78 lines (Creuzer's number 41, at 81 lines), which is concerned with ethics in terms of the achievement of divine knowledge and the soul's union with God.

4 "Allai hai aretai tou politikou, kai allai hai ton pros theorian aniontos" (Porphyry, Sententiae 32; 22:14-15, Lamberz).

5 "Hai men tou politikou en metriopatheia keimenai to hepesthai kai akolouthein to logismo tou kathekontos kata tas praxeis: dio pros koinonian blepousai ten ablabe ton plesion ek tou sunagelasmou kai tes koinoniaspolitikai legontai" (Ibid.; 23:3-8).

6 "kai esti phronesis men peri to logizomenon, andria de peri to thumoumenon, sophrosune de en homologia kai sumphonia epithumetikou pros logismon, dikaiosune de he ekastou touton homou oikeiopragia arkes peri kai tou archesthai" (Ibid.; 23:8-12).

7 "he men oun kata tas politikas aretas diathesis en metriopatheia theoreitai, telos ekousa to zen hos anthropon kata phusin, he de kata tas theoretikas en apatheia, hes telos he pros theon omoiosis" (Ibid.; 25:6-9).

8 "kaiprodromaoige haipolitikai ton katharseon" (Ibid.; 24:6-7).

9 "dio en tais katharsesi to men me sundoxazein to somati, alia monen energein huphistesi to phronein, ho dia tou katharos noein teleioutai, to de ge me homopathein sunistesi to sophronein, to de me phobeisthai aphistamenen tou somatos hos eis kenon ti kai me on ten andrian, hegoumenou de logou kai nou kai medenos antiteinontos he dikaiosune" (Ibid.; 24:9-25:1).

10 "allhepsuches ouk en agathon, allagathoumetechein dunamenon kai agathoeides...to oun agathon aute en to suneinai togennesanti..." (Ibid.; 26:9-12).

11 "allo oun genos triton areton meta tas kathartikas kai politikas, noeros tes psuches energouses..." (Ibid.; 27:7-9).

13 Here and elsewhere I replace Davidson's use of "intellect" with "nous."

14 Here and elsewhere "proper action" replaces Davidson's rather too Hegelian translation of

"oikeiopragia" as "self-related action."

15 "sophia men kai phronesis en theoria hon nous echei, dikaiosune de oikeiopragia en te pros ton noun akolouthia kai to pros noun energein, sophrosune de he eiso pros noun strophe, he de andria apatheia kath homoiosin tou pros ho blepei apathes o ten phusin" (Ibid.; 27:928:4).

16 "hai de psuches pros noun enoroses ede kaipleroumenes ap autou" (Ibid.; 29:10-11).

17 "hai de psuches anthropou kathairomenes te kai kathartheises apo somatos kai ton alogon pathon" (Ibid.; 29:11-12).

18 "hai de psuches anthropou katakosmouses ton anthropon dia to metra te alogia aphorizein kaimetriopatheian energazesthai" (Ibid.; 29:12-30:1).

19 This use of "intellectual virtues" should not be confused with the sense of "intellectual virtues" that is contrasted with "moral virtues" by Aquinas (e.g. ST1-2.53) and Aristotle (Nichomachean Ethics 1103a14ff); the Aristotelian contrast between the intellectual and moral virtues is much closer to Porphyry's distinction between the purificative (contemplative) and political (practical) virtues—but even here the parallel is not perfect.

20 "Tetarton de eidos areton to ton paradeigmatikon, haiper esan en to no, kreittous ousai ton psuchikon kai touton paradeigmata, hon hai tes psuches esan homoiomata: nous men en ho hama ta hosper paradeigmata" (Porphyry, Sententiae 32; 28:6-29:3, Lamberz).

21 Davidson has "self-relatedness."

22 "sophia de ginoskon ho nous, to de pros auton he sophrosune, to de oikeion ergon he oikeiopragia, he de andria he tautotes kai to eph heautou menein katharon dia dunameos periousian" (Ibid.; 29:4-7).

23 "dio kai ho men kata tas praktikas energon spoudais en anthropos, ho de kata tas kathartikas daimonios anthropos e kai daimon agathos, ho de kata monas tas pros ton noun theos, ho de kata tas paradeigmatikas theon pater" (Ibid.; 31:4-8).

24 "ouketi mentoi to echein kai tas elattous ho echon tas meizous energesei kata tas elattous proegoumenos, alia monon kata peristasin tes geneseos" (Ibid.; 30:2-5).

25 One manuscript variation actually gives: ton de loipon analogos tois eirhmenois, "the scope of the others [the pattern virtues] is in a manner analogous to those mentioned [the political, contemplative, and intellectual virtues]," (Ibid., 31:3-4); but even without this explicit statement, the causal dependence and hierarchical ordering of the levels of virtue establish the analogical relationship.

The text of Bonaventure, Collationes 6:25-32, is taken from Macrobius's In Somnium Scipionis, chapter 8, from paragraph 3 (all but the first line) to the first line of paragraph 11. On Plotinus and Porphyry as sources for Macrobius, see note 1, supra. Bonaventure, Collationes 6.1: "Propter primam visionem intelligentiae per naturam inditae sumtum est verbum illud: Vidit Deus lucem, id est videre fecit radiat lux ut Veritas rerum, ut Veritas vocum, ut veritas morum Et ad hoc venerunt philosophi et nobiles eorum et antiqui, quod esset principium et finis et ratio exemplaris."

Ibid., 6.2: "Divisittamen Deus lucem a tenebris, ut, sicut dictum est de Angelis, sic dicatur de philosophis. Sed unde aliqui tenebras secuti sum? Ex hoc, quod licet omnes viderint primam causam omnium principium, omnium finem, in medio tamen diversificati sunt. Nam aliqui negaverunt, in ipsa esse exemplaria rerum; quorum princeps videtur fuisse Aristoteles, qui.. .exsecratur ideas Platonis."

Ibid., 6.6: "Dico ergo, quod ilia lux aeterna est exemplar omnium, et quod mens elevata, ut mens aliorum nobilium philosophorum antiquorum, ad hoc pervenit. In ilia ergo promo occurrunt animae exemplaria virtutum."

Ibid., 6.7: "Apparent ergo primo in luce aeterna virtutes exemplares sive exemplaria virtutum, scilicet celsitudo puritatis, pulcritudo claritatis, fortitude virtutis, rectitudo diffusionis."

Ibid., 6.10: "Haec imprimuntur in anima per illam lucem exemplarem et descendunt in cognitivam, in affectivam, in operativam. Ex celsitudine puritatis imprimatur sinceritas temperentiae; ex pulcritudine claritatis serenitas prudentiae; ex fortitudine virtutis stabilitas constantiae; ex rectitudine diffusionis suavitas iustitiae."

Ibid.: "Hae sunt quatuor virtutes exemplares, de quibus tota sacra Scriptura agit; et Aristoteles nihil de his sensit, sed antiqui et nobiles philosophi."

Ibid., 6.24: "Hae virtutes fluunt a luce aeterna in hemisphaerium nostrae mentis et reducunt animam in suam originem, sicut radius perpendicularis sive directus eadem via revertitur, qua incessit. Et haec est beatitude. Unde primo sunt politicae, secundo purgatoriae, tertio animi iam purgati. Politicae sunt in actione, purgatoriae in contemplatione, animi iam purgati in lucis visione."

Ibid., 6.25: "Et de his agit Salamon, ut dicit Origenes, de politicis in Proverbiis, de purgatoriis in Ecclesiaste, de animi iam purgati in Cantico canticorum." In fact Bonaventure's attribution to Origen of this insight is a stretch. In his prologue to the Song of Songs Origen discusses not a Greek hierarchy of virtues but the traditional Greek division of disciplines into moral, physical and theoretical; it is this division that Origen says Solomon understood before the Greeks and treated in turn in Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and the Song of Songs. Ibid, 7.1.

Ibid., 7.3: ".alii philosophi illuminati.posuerunt virtutes exemplares, a quibus fluunt virtutes cardinales, primo in vim cognitivam et per illam in affectivam, deinde in operativam.. "

Ibid., 7.4: "Illi autem praecipui philosophi posuerunt, sic etiam illuminati, tamen sine fide, per defluxum in nostram cognitionem virtutes cardinales. Quae primo dicuntur politicae, in quantum docent conversationem in mundo; secundo, purgatoriae quantum ad solitariam contemplationem; tertio, purgati animi, ut animam quietari faciant in exemplari. Dixerunt ergo, per has virtutes animam modificari, purgari et reformari."

Ibid., 7.3: "Sed adhuc isti in tenebris fuerunt, quia non habuerunt lumen fidei. ..." Cf. Ibid., 7.5: "Sed adhuc in tenebris sunt."

Ibid., 7.12: "Isti philosophi habuerunt pennas struthionum, quia affectus non erant sanati nee ordinati nee rectificati; quod non fit nisi per fidem."

Albertus Magnus also mentions this Neoplatonic theory, attributing it to Plotinus (Albertus Magnus, Super Ethica Commentum et Quaestiones 2.2; 4:12; 5.3; 7.11).

41 ST1-2.61.5: "Utrum virtutes cardinales convenienter dividantur in virtutes politicas, purgatorias, purgati animi, et exemplares."

42 Ibid., corpus: "Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut Augustinus dicit in libro de Moribus Eccles., oportet quod anima aliquid sequatur, ad hoc quod ei possit virtus innasci: et hoc Deus est, quern si sequimur, bene vivimus." The citation of Augustine is from De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae 1.6.

43 ST1-2.61.5, corpus: ".exemplar humanae virtutis in Deo praeexistat, sicut et in eo praeexistunt omnium rerum rationes. Sic igitur virtus potest considerari vel prout est exemplariter in Deo, et sic dicuntur virtutes 'exemplares'. Ita scilicet quod ipsa divina mens in Deo dicatur prudentia; temperantia vero, conversio divinae intentionis ad seipsum...; fortitude autem Dei est eius immutabilitas; iustitia vero Dei est observatio legis aeternae in suis operibus, sicut Plotinus dixit." Cf. Quaestiones de Virtutibus Cardinalibus 1.4 ("Utrum virtutes cardinales maneant in patria"): ".fortitude divina est eius immobilitas; temperentia erit conversio mentis divinae ad seipsam; prudentia autem est ipsa mens divina; iustitia autem Dei ipsa lex eius perennis."

44 ST1-2.61.5, corpus: "Et quia homo secundum suam naturam est animal politicum, virtutes huiusmodi, prout in homine existunt secundum conditionem suae naturae, politicae vocantur: prout scilicet homo secundum has virtutes recte se habet in rebus humanis gerendis. Secundum quern modum hactenus de his virtutibus locuti sumus." Cf. 1-2.61.1, corpus: ".dicendum quod, cum simpliciter de virtute loquimur, intelligimur loqui de virtute humana."

45 ST1-2.61.5, ad. 1: ".dicendum quod Philosophus loquitur de his virtutibus secundum quod sunt circa res humanas: puta iustitia circa emptiones et venditiones, fortitude circa timores, temperantia circa concupiscentias. Sic enim ridiculum est eas Deo attribuere."

46 Ibid., ad. 2: "dicendum quod virtutes humanae sunt circa passiones, scilicet virtutes hominum in hoc mundo conversantium. Sed virtutes eorum qui plenam beatitudenem assequuntur, sunt absque passionibus." Cf. Quaestiones de Virtutibus Cardinalibus 1.4: "Dicendum, quod in patria manent virtutes cardinales, et habebunt ibi alios actus quam hie."

47 ST1-2.61.5, ad 3: ".dicendum quod deserere res humanas ubi necessitas imponitur, vitiosum est: alias est virtuosum."

48 Augustine's words are from De Civitate Dei 19.19.

49 ST1-2.61.5, corpus: ".quaedam sunt virtutes transeuntium et in divinam similitudinem tendentium: et hae vocantur virtutes purgatoriae. Ita scilicet quod prudentia omnia mundana divinorum contemplatione despiciat, omnemque animae cogitationem in divina sola diregat; temperantia vero relinquat, inquantum natura patitur, quae corporis usus requirit; fortitudinis autem est ut anima non terreatur propter excessum a corpore, et accessum ad superna; iustitia vero est ut tota anima consentiat ad huius propositi viam."

50 Ibid.: "Quaedam vero sunt virtutes iam assequentium divinam similitudinem: quae vocantur virtutes iam purgati animi. Ita scilicet quod prudentia sola divina intueatur; temperantia terrenas cupiditates nesciat; fortitude passiones ignoret; iustitia cum divina mente perpetua foedere societur, earn scilicet imitando. Quas quidem virtutes dicimus esse beatorum vel aliquorum in hac vita perfectissimorum." Cf. De Virtutibus Cardinalibus 1.4, ad. 7: "dicendum, quod virtutes purgati animi, quas Plotinus definiebat, possunt convenire beads nam prudentiae ibi est sola divina intueri; temperantiae, cupiditates oblivisci fortitudinis, passiones ignorare; iustitiae, perpetuum foedus cum Deo habere.' Mark Jordan has suggested that in ST 1-2.67.1, Aquinas says that both the purifying and the purified virtues remain in patria (Jordan 1993, 239). In fact, in that question Aquinas says that in patria the "formal" element of the moral virtues remains without the "material" element, and Aquinas' description of what these virtues are like is consistent with the position articulated in ST 12.61.5, that only purified virtues are had in patria.

51 Gilson 1938, 422: ".should we hold.that there is a divine illumination of the virtues corresponding to the divine illumination of the ways of knowing? That is the key problem of morality for Bonaventure, and his solution makes morality exactly parallel with knowledge and binds both of them to their common origin in illumination from above."

52 John Inglis offers a more detailed historiographical discussion of why such questions themselves need to be called into question (Inglis 1998). Inglis discusses the question of the character and relation of Aquinas's philosophy and theology, with special attention to ethics, in the final chapter, "The False Dichotomy of Reason and Revelation."

53 See De Anima, 429b22, 430al7-27, 431bl7-19; see also Nichomachean Ethics 1178a22-24.

References

Albertus Magnus. 1987. Super Ethica Commentum et Quaestiones. Edited by W.Kübel. In Opera Omnia, Vols.13 and 14. Minister: Aschendorff.

Aquinas, Thomas. 1965. Quaestiones de Virtutibus Cardinalibus. In Quaestiones Disputate, Vol. 2. Turin: Marietti.

--. 1952. Summa Theologiae. Leonine Edition. 4 Vols. Turin: Marietti.

Bonaventure. 1947. Collationes in Hexaemeron. In Obras de San Buenaventura, Vol. 3. Edited by L.Amoros, B.Aperribay and M.Oromi. Madrid: Biblioteca de auctores Christianos.

Gersh, S. 1986. Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism: The Latin Tradition. 2 Vols. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press.

Gilson, E. 1938. The Philosophy ofSaint Bonaventure. Translated by D.I. Trethowan and F.J.Sheed. New York: Sheed and Ward.

Inglis, J. 1998. Spheres of Philosophical Inquiry and the Historiography of Medieval Philosophy. Leiden: E.J.Brill.

Jordan, M. 1993. "Theology and Philosophy." In The Cambridge Companion to Aquinas. Edited by N.Kretzmann and E.Stump. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Macrobius. 1952. Commentary on the Dream of Scipio. Translated by W.H.Stahl. New York: Columbia University Press.

Plotinus. 1961. The Enneads. Translated by S.MacKenna. 3rd ed. rev. B.S. Page. London: Faber and Faber, Ltd.

--. 1855. Plotini Enneades cum Marsilii Ficini Interpretation Castigata. Edited by F.Creuzer and G.H.Moser. Paris: A.F.Didot.

Porphyry. 1869. "The Sentences of Porphyry the Philosopher." Translated by Thomas Davidson. In Journal of Speculative Philosophy 3:46-73.

--. 1975. Sententiae ad intelligibilia ducentes. Edited by E.Lamberz. Leipzig: Teubner.

SECTION SIX THE LATIN RECEPTION

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