reason and volition of consenting adults. This is nowhere clearer than in Julian of Eclanum's claim that free will 'emancipates' one from God.61 Here, he follows in Pelagius' footsteps, who maintained that the ability to choose makes us 'sui iuris'.62 Moral analysis for the Pelagians begins with adulthood and rational agency. Their ideal is an autonomous person functioning in a godly manner.

Augustine's ideal is otherwise; for him, the very idea of autonomy leading to godliness is hopeless. He sees human nature as profoundly wounded because of ancestral sin. His bleak view on the condemnation of unbaptised babies (who are punished eternally, albeit 'most lightly')63 is well known - but what is not as widely appreciated is the extent to which the Christian baby is symbolic of an important Augustinian insight into Christianity. Augustine sees in the babe at the mother's breast an image of the utter dependence of the creature upon the Creator.64 This warm and loving image is applicable to fully mature Christians no less than Christian babies, who are all alike reliant on the sustaining love of God. This perception of the basic parity of the community helps us understand why Augustine sees the sacrament of baptism (even understood as the 'sacrament of the faith') applying in the same way to all persons: every good thing - including will and faith - must ultimately come from God the Spirit.65 Because salvation is first and foremost a divine action, infants are not distinct in principle from adults simply because they cannot speak, act or believe for themselves; it is not because of their speaking, acting or believing that adults are saved through baptism, but because God is at work in baptism.

Augustine has no more difficulty in acknowledging the efficacy of a baptism where the sponsors and indeed the church as a whole are able to act on behalf of infants than he does in acknowledging the efficacy of an adult's

61 Julian, ap. Augustine, Incomplete work against Julian 1.78 (CSEL 85: 93): 'Libertas arbi-trii, qua a deo emancipatus homo est, in ammittendi peccati et abstinendi a peccato possibilitate consistit.'

62 Pelagius, To Demetrias 4 (PL 33: 1101). Because of this claim by Pelagius, one may reject Gisbert Greshake's assertion that emancipation from God does not follow human freedom according to pelagisch thought: see Greshake, Gnade als konkrete Freiheit, 65-6, and, for the difference between something that is pelagisch and something that is pelagianisch (an admirable distinction not available in English), 27 n. 3.

63 Augustine, On the merit and remission of sins and on infant baptism 1.16.21 (CSEL 60: 20).

64 Cf. Augustine, Confessions 4.1.1 (ed. O'Donnell, i: 33): 'For what am I to myself without you, but a guide to my own downfall? Or what am I, even at my best, but one sucking your milk and feeding upon you, the food that does not perish? But what is any man at all, when he is merely a man?'.

65 Thus, Augustine, Free will (CCSL 29: 314-15), On baptism 4.24.31 (CSEL 51: 259-60), and esp. Letter 98.2 (CSEL 342: 521-3); cf. Camelot, 'Sacramentum fidei'.

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