that Tertullian had already used in the West and that was present in previous philosophy.10 The divinity remained unchangeable in the incarnation. For the power of God (Luke. 1.35) 'performed the work of incarnation' and remained nevertheless the power of God. 'In the same way the Logos of God, during his human life on earth, preserved his divine omnipresence, because he accomplished everything and at the same time in a special way was mixed with the flesh.' In the incarnate One 'the uncreated being exists in a mixture with the created'. This mixture is compared to the mixture in the human being of body and soul, in which both preserve their own qualities or properties. He maintains that the preservation of the differences a fortiori applies in the incarnation, in which the divinity in its immutability remains unmixed. To this extent the category of mixture serves the purpose of enabling the confession of the incarnate One as 'the paradoxical One'.

Apollinarius repeatedly uses this anthropological paradigm11 to rule out in Christ any mixture in which what is proper to God or the flesh is changed into something inappropriate to them according to their nature. In line with philosophical tradition, he calls this type of mixture a synchysis.12 He also uses the comparison, already proposed by Origen, of iron glowing in the fire; for Apollinarius, it is Christ's body, which in the union with the Logos (here, the fire) remains body, 'although he grants the divine energies to those who are able to touch him'.

His concept of mixture implies an ontology of 'the part and the whole' which, however, he qualifies for Christological statements. This has not always been recognised by his contemporaries, or indeed by modern scholars. In the constitution of the individual human being, body and soul are incomplete parts, because in their very natures they complement each other. Such a 'connaturality' (symphyia) does not exist in the incarnate One; a fortiori, the properties of the parts remain preserved in Christ. Thus Apollinarius can use the concepts of synthesis and of the one as a whole, without conceiving the Logos and 'the flesh' as incomplete parts. He nevertheless excludes a union 'of two complete beings', that is, of two sons, the Son of God and a son of man. For such a human being does not owe her/his existence to the union with the Logos, whereas the one born of the Virgin does.

10 A brief depiction is offered by H. A. Wolfson, The philosophy of the church fathers, 374-85.

11 On the history of the paradigm as Christological argument, cf. U. M. Lang, John Philo-ponus, 101-34 (with bibliography).

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