than itself, and that, therefore, we are obliged to think of it as a reflexion in something else than itself. Thus the image in one way looks to the ideal reality as its substance, and in another way to that in which it has, so to speak, it's local habitation. It is characteristic of the phenomenal that it can be presented to us only through this curious combination of metaphor and analogical inference, but no such ambiguous nature could possibly belong to that which is real in the full sense of the word.
But we cannot leave the matter at this point. If Plato be right in saying that we fall into an
illegitimate way of thinking when we attribute in-
substance to the phenomenal, he cannot b
be right in saying that such a way of thinking is necessary. He is, in fact, attempting to find a way between the two horns of a dilemma. He is trying to conceive the ideal as manifesting itself in the phenomenal, and yet at the same time, as having
an absolute reality which is complete in itself with out any manifestation. Conversely, he would like to i* ■ ' * . ■ • * . "
treat the phenomenal as if it were nothing at all,
or, at least a 'mere appearance' which adds nothing it •
to the ideal reality. Yet he cannot deny that even an appearance or image has a kind of reality of its own, and that it needs to be accounted for. Hence, when he abandoned the simple method of Parmenides, who denied that phenomena have any reality at all, be
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