absolute opposition of the universal and the in-
dividual, which Teichmuller and others have regarded as the # essential characteristic of his philosophy. He must conceive the soul as possessed of what might be called a 'universal individuality,' an individuality which is one with its idea, and which, therefore, partakes of the eternity that belongs to the idea. Now, the argument by which,
in the Phaedo, Plato endeavoured to secure an exceptional position for the soul, is certainly fallacious as he has there stated it; but we find that, in later dialogues, he gave it another and less ambiguous form. For there we find him maintaining, not that the soul is immortal because it partakes in the idea of life, but that the ultimate principle of life, as of all substantial reality, is the soul. We may clearly trace the development of this thought in the Republic, and the Phaedrus.
In the Republic Plato lays down the principle that a thing can be destroyed only by its own evil, by that which specially mars and corrupts its own nature. Hence the soul cannot be injured the diseases of the body or destroyed by its death, except in so far as these bring with them evils that directly affect the soul itself, namely, the evils of injustice and intemperance, folly and ignorance. But can the soul be destroyed even by these its own diseases? On the contrary, we often find that its
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