abstraction from the intelligible world, but as presupposing and including it. It is * divine reason,' as the ultimate unity of all the ideas of things, and so as the principle at once of knowing and of being.
But this involves another transition. If mind be the principle of the universe, we cannot contemplate all the parts of the universe as equally far from it and equally near to it There are
ideal principles in all things, but the principle of life and consciousness raises the beings that partake in it above other beings or things; for all soul is divine and " has the care of all inanimate or soul«* less being, and traverses the whole, universe,"1 taking one form at one time and another at another. Every soul, as such, is a self-determining being, whose life cannot be overpowered or destroyed by anything external to itself. It is thus immortal, and above the power of death and time* And if, in any sense, it be made subject to them, it must be by its own act
This at once brings us to a problem which greatly exercised the mind of Plato in the latest i period of his life, as is shown by the Philebus and i the Timaeus, the problem of the relation of the ideal to the phenomenal world. In one way this problem had now become much more complex and difficult for him; for he could no longer be
1 Phaedrua, 346 B.
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