externally determined in all its changes. Hence the phenomenal is contrasted with the intelligible world, or, what; is the same thing, with the intelligence, as that which is moved by another with that which is moved by itself; or, in other words, as that which is under the sway of necessity with that which is self-determined or free.1 But though primarily and in itself the phenomenal world is the sphere of necessity, even in it Plato holds that actually necessity
is subjected to a higher principle, which, however, never completely does away with it. " All these things, constituted as they are by the necessity of nature, the Creator of what is best in the world of becoming took to himself at thé time when he was producing the self-sufficing and most perfect God;2 and while he used the necessary causes as his ministers in the accomplishment of his work, it was by his own art that he realised the good in all the creation. Wherefore we must distinguish two kinds of causes, the necessary and the divine ; and, so far as our nature admits, we must make the divine in
1 It is to be observed that Plato views that which is moved by another as entirely passive, and that he has no idea of any reaction involved in the transmission of motion. The abstract contrast of that which is self-moved with that which is moved by another, i. e^ pare activity with pure passivity, is what makes the union of mind and body so accidental and external with Plato.
8 Tim., 68 e seq. The universe as an organic whole, as we shall see in the sequel, is conceived by Plato as a ' second God,' who is 6A like as possible to the first, t
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