In this case the question is not merely of the presence or absence of a special bodily organ; for reason, according to Aristotle, has no* sugh organ. Yet its existence in the body and its connexion with the animal nature, subjects it to conditions which alter its pure activity, and bring it down from the intuitive contemplation of truth to the of imagination and of discursive thought. Hence Aristotle says that " the discursive reason and the feelings of love and hate are not modes or affections of reason, but of the subject in which it
is realised, though they are clue to that realisation. Hence, when this subject is destroyed, reason ceases to remember and to love ; for such states belong not to it, but to the being-in whom soul and body are combined (too koivov), and this, of course, perishes. But reason in itself is something more divine and
cannot be the subject of any such modes as these.
It would appear, then, that Aristotle holds that the individual mind, as such, i.e.. the individual's consciousness of his own past and of all the ¿particulars of his individual life, with all the desires and feelings which accompany such a consciousness, is changeable
• • , 1 1 , i 1 a and mortal In this region of the finite, reason sinks
into * discourse of reason'; in other words, it no longer sees all things m
unity, but; aided by sensuous * l>r 4 W.,408fv 25
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