opposite; and that which is always changing in every aspect of it, can not be known even as changing. Again, looking at the question from the side of the subject "pure Sensationalism is speechless"; for we can neither distinguish one sensation from, nor identify it with another, unless our thought goes beyond the sensation itself. "There is, therefore, i no knowledge in the impressions of sense, but only in the discourse of reason in regard to them/'1
In the Sophist, again, the same results are shown to follow from the opposite doctrine, that is, from the abstract Eleatic assertion of the absolute unity and permanence of being; for, if no difference be admitted in the aspects of the One, wo cannot say anything about it. Even to affirm that 'the One is,' implies some distinction between being and unity. Every predication, in short, if it means anything, involves a relative difference between the subject and the predicate, and bare identity means nothing at all. Similar reasons make it impossible to give any meaning to a permanence which is without change, movement or activity. Neither absolute motion without rest nor absolute rest without motion can be conceived, but only the union of the two—
that which combines motion and rest, or which
1 Theaet., 186 d. fr fikv &pa rots iraBj/xcurar oi)k toi iicurHi^ to 34
t€fA ¿kcIpuv ovXKoyurOf course, syllogism has not yet it» technical senso.
Was this article helpful?