we are attempting to describe the relations of spiritual beings, who are members of the great organic whole of the universe, to that divine Spirit which is tfie principle of that whole. Bather we are obliged to say that these members are active, because, and just so far as, the principle of the whole is active in them.
It appears, then, that there is an essential fallacy in the Kantian attempt to confine science to the sphere of phenomenal objects which are connected together only by an external necessity, and to refer all our higher consciousness of reality, whether religious or philosophical, to the demands of practical reason. But the same criticism applies also to the opposite view of Aristotle, that it is the practical reason which is immersed in the phenomenal world— in the world of external necessity and contingency of which science in the strict sense of the term is impossible; while it is the theoretical reason which alone is able to grasp things in their essential nature, and to follow out the inner necessity by which all
their attributes are connected; and, above all, it is the theoretical reason alone that can rise to the contemplation of God as the principle of all reality, the first and the final cause of the universe. We must,.I think, recognise that in this view also there is an unhappy divorce between the two sides of man's life; and that his higher or religious consciousness can no
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more be conceived as abstractly theoretical than it can be conceived as abstractly practical. The idea that science is concerned only with deducing the nature of things from their essential .definitions— from the formal or final cause of their being—is as one-sided as the Kantian conception that it has to do only with measuring the phenomena as they are given, and determining the external conditions of their co-existence or succession. For neither of these is possible without the other. A teleology that takes no account of mechanism is as imperfect as a mechanical philosophy that takes no account of teleology. The latter, indeed, is less of an illusion; for a science that deals with efficient, and not with formal or final causes, ' is at true science so far as it goes. It enables us" to find order in the world, though it may be only an external order. It thus lays the true foundation for a systematic view of things, even though it may not be able to give to that view the highest kind of unity.
It exhibits to us the anatomical structure and mechanical relations of the parts of the body, though it is not able to detect the secret of its life. On the other hand, as the work of the Scholastics often showed, the attempt to deal directly and immediately with formal and final causes, is apt to lead to a philosophy of foregone conclusions, which stereotypes our first notions of things, and attempts, by merely analysing these notions, to add to our knowledge of their objects.
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